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[47 C.2d
based upon the ground
of the evidence" was a matter for the
trial court to determine in the exercise of a ''broad discretion" and there
to have been "no abuse" thereof.
(Keeler
supra, p. 137.) [2b] Since the question of
the
the
as a party to
this action \Yas not discussed in the
it manicannot affect the determination of that essential issue
here. \V e therefore conclude that when
thereafter
refused to amend his
so as to join the corporation
as a party, the action could not continue on its behalf and the
trial court had no alternative but to order its dismissaL
(Beyerbach v. Juno Oil
s?.tpra, 42 Cal.2d
28.)
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J.,
and McComb,
concurred.

Traynor,

Schauer, J.,

F. No. 19671. In Bank. Feb. 1, 1957.]
CITY OF W~<\.LNU'r
Petitioner, v. EDWARD J.
SILVEIRA, as City Treasurer, etc., Respondent.
[1] Public Securities-Issuance-Mandamus.-Mandamus is an ap-

treasurer to sign bonds
propriate remedy to compel a
authorized to be issued pursuant to the Limited Obligation
Bond Law of 1955 (Stats. 1955, ch. 1847; Gov. Code,
4364843702) if the proposed issue meets the requirements of the
law, since the acts demanded are ministerial duties.
[2] Municipal Corporations-Legislative Control- Classification:
Municipal Affairs.-There must be a reasonable basis for popu[1] See Cal.Jur., Public Securities. § 11; Am.Jur., Mandamus,
§ 468 et seq.
[2] See Cal.Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 87 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Municipal Corporations, § 76 et seq.
McK. Dig. References:
Public Securities, ~ 12: [2] Municipal Corporations, §§ 83, 88; [3] Constitutional Law, §§ 150, 157;
[4] Constitutional Law,§ 149; [5, 14,
18] Municipal Corporations, § 187; [6] Constitutional Law, ~ 150: [7, 9] Constitutional
Law,§ 156; [8] Constitutional
§ 163; [10] Constitutional Law,
§ 60; [11] Evidence, § 18:
Municipal Corporations, § 86; [13]
Municipal Corporations, § 86(3); [16, 17] Municipal Corporations,
§ 174.

a municipal affair.
Constitutional Law-Classification.-From "'"c"~'"'" the Legislegislation
lature
in order that
must be
to the
of the
but
the Confounded
a reason which
in legislation.
[4]
not be arbitrary for
the mere purpose of
or in order that legislation
really local or special may seem to be
but must be
for the purpose of meeting different conditions naturally requiring different legislation.
[5a, 5b] Municipal Corporations- Fiscal Matters- Bonds.-The
intended classification
the Limited Obligation Bond Law of
1955 (Stats. 1955, ch. 1847; Gov.
§§ 43648-43702) of a
small city with a large surrounding urban population so as to
permit such city to finance through sales and use taxes local
improvements to accommodate the influx of people from the
surrounding unincorporated area is not unreasonable, since
it would be inequitable for city residents and taxpayers alone
to bear the burden of financing the improvements.
[6] Constitutional Law-Classification- Legislative Discretion.Wide discretion is vested in the Legislature in making a classification, and the Legislature's decision as to what is a sufficient
distinction to warrant the classification will not be overthrown
by the courts unless it is
arbitrary and beyond reasonable doubt erroneous.
[7] Id.-Classification-Reasonableness.-A distinction in legistion is not arbitrary if any set of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it.
[8] Id.-Cla.ssification-Presumptions.-Where the Lfgislature has
made a classification, the ('Xistence of facts supporting the
legislative judgment is to be presumed, and the burden of
overcoming the presumption of constitutionality is cast on the
assailant.
[9] Id.-Classification-Reasonableness.-A legislative classification is reasonable if it has a substantial relation to a legitimate object to be accomplished.
[10] !d.-Constitutionality of Statutes- Wisdom.-Whether the
Legislature has adopted the wisest and most suitable means of
[ 4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, § 272 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Constitutional Law, § 476 et seq.

circulation in the commercial area, fall
the definition of
" as those words are used in the Constitution.
Matters-Bonds.-The Limited Obligation Bond
ch. 1847; Gov. Code,§§ 43648-43702),
urban popureauire,mo:nt that the legislation relate to a
declaring

interest.
[16]

Payable Out of Special
a constitutional provision such as Const., art.
the amount of indebtedness which a city or
uoJLlLlmu subdivision or agency may incur, is not violated
by revenue bonds or other obligations which are payable solely
from a special fund, provided the governmental body is not
liable to maintain the special fund out of its general funds, or
by tax levies, should the special fund prove insufficient.
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division
limitation
Id.-Fiscal
of

John
feld &
neth I.
for Petitioner.
Richard IVL ~•wu··~···.r Richard B. Maxwell
for Respondent.

HarzKen-

Manker

CARTER, J.-By this
mandamus the petitioner, city of Walnut
the
treasurer
to issue certain bonds. The bonds were authorized to be issued
pursuant to the Limited
1955, ch. 1847; Gov.
~Iandamns
is an appropriate
sign the bonds if the
of the law since the acts demanded
(City of Oxnard v. Dale,
The act here involved is
population of 4,000 or less, which
of the
one-seventh of the total
incorporated urban area within a radius of
miles of its
limits. Section 6 of article XI of the state Constitution provides that "Corporations for
purposes shall not be
created by special laws; but the
laws, provide for the
fication, in proportion
which laws may be
1
It has been
according to
organization
classification,
the general laws required "by the
classified" (Rauer Y. Williams, 118

808

C.2d
here is whether the act here in-

ing or invalid
The city of vValnut Creek lS a "general law city" (Gov.
Code, §
. The 1949
version of the Classification
Act and
Bill was repealed in 1955
(Stats.
p.
and the
established
"chartered cities" and "
§ 34100 et
Pursuant to
Law, the
of Walnut
after notice duly
and a
hearing, determined that the
formula was met and
adopted a resolution in accordance with its findings (Gov.
2
Code, §§
43649).
meeting,
the city
by a two-thirds
and adopted a
resolution that the public interest and necessity demanded the
acquisition, construction and
of certain municipal
improvements and
for a municipal bond election.
At a subsequent meeting an ordinance was adopted which
called for a special election in the
of Walnut Creek to
submit to the electors of the
a proposition for incurring
a bonded indebtedness to cover the cost of said improvements.
Notice was duly given. At a subsequent meeting, one section
of the ordinance was amended and notice duly given thereof.
The election was duly and regularly called and held in the
manner provided by law; two-thirds of the votes cast at the
election were in favor of, and authorized the issuance of the
limited obligation bonds. 8
The Limited Obligation Bond Law of 1955 defines limited
obligation bonds as bonds which are to be paid solely from
sales and use taxes imposed and to be imposed and collected
by the city ( § 43650). The law also provides that the bonds
shall state that they are to be paid only from such revenues
(§§ 43651, 43654); that the term of the bonds shall not exceed
31 years and that "'rhe outstanding bonds shall not at any one
time exceed an amount for which the average installments of
principal and interest will exceed 66% per cent of tl1e net
revenues to be derived from the imposition of sales taxes at
the rate establishrd at the time of calling the election at which
the proposition of authorizing their issuance is submitted, as
2
The iindings of the legislrrtive body as to such popubtion, made after
notice and public hearing, shall be conclusiYc.
"There is no contention that the city failed to comply with any provision in the law regarding notice or hearing, or with any other requirement thereof.
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a
( 48654.1.) rrhe general
is not liable for the payment
the bonds or interest thereon;
the revenues derived from
tax are liable therefor ( § 43663).
The
bonds on
at such a price
that
installments of
and interest
bond issue of
will not exceed
per cent of the net reYennes be derived from sales taxes
which was the rate established
of the ordinance calling the election
at which the issuance of the bonds ·was authorized. The rerefused to issue the bonds and this
spondent,
proceeding followed. 'l'his was in accord with the statutory
provision. 4
[2] Limited Obligation Boncl Law as a valid general law
with respect to
: It should be noted, preliminarily,
that two principles
population classification and
legislation based thereon have been established in this state
(see Rauer v. Williarns, 118 Cal. 401 [50 P. 691]; Ex parte
Jackson, 143 Cal. 564, 569, 570 [77 P. 457]): (1) That there
must be a reasonable basis for such elassification with respect
to the subject matter of the legislation; and (2) that the legislation must relate to a municipal affair.
[3] (1) Reasonable basis ntle: In Darcy v. Mayor etc.
of San Jose, 104 Cal. 642, 645, 646
P. 500], it was said
that ''Legislatures and eourts are not at liberty to disregard
a poliey so plainly manifested in the fundamental law. But,
while the sovereign will is thus plainly
in the fundamental law, the rule must not reeeive an interpretation too
absolute. It will not be presumed that it was intended to
deprive the legislature of all power to adapt its laws to the
varying conditions of its inhabitants. From necessity it has
been held that the legislature may classify in order that it
may adapt its legislation to the needs of the people. If this
eannot be done laws will not always bear equally upon the
people. This elassification, however, must be founded upon
differenees which are either defined by the constitution or
natural, and which will suggest a reason which might rationally be held to justify the diversity in the legislation. [ 4] It
must not be arbitrary, for the mere purpose of classification,
that legislation really local or special may seem to be general,
'Government Code, scetion 43654.1.

0.2d

area. For
residents and taxthe burden of financing such improvebe
The only type of
is available from residents living
and use tax within the city since
upon both residents and nonthe city, and not denied by the reof 1954 there were 115 cities of under 4,000
in the state although there are no available figures
all of these could meet the second population
the Limited Obligation Bond Law. It is
and not denied by respondent, that the
of municipalities today is the improveof municipal facilities in order to keep
needs precipitated by the growth within and
boundaries. The Limited Obligation Bond Law
''an urgency measure necessary for the imof the public peace, health or safety
.uLcau.,u;.; of Article IV of the Constitution and shall
The facts constituting such necesare:
'There is
an unprecedented population growth
under way within the State and the cities therein. In many
cities
has caused the facilities within the commercial area of a
to be taxed beyond the general means
of the
or for which no general benefit exists beyond the
commercial area therein. The proceeds of sales taxes are derived
the sale of merchandise within such commercial
areas and constitute an appropriate means of revenue for rethe eonditions
within said commercial areas.
''Other
required by reason of said growth are
of
benefit. However, by reason of said unproperty taxes have seriously increased
and it is
that other sources of revenue be provided
to pay the costs of needed improvements." (Stats. 1955, ch.
1847, § 2, pp. 3429, 3430.)

Feb.

[6] We said in Drib in
351, 352 (231 P.2d
pertinent
vested in the

tional doubt erroneous. [
lation is not
any
conceived that would sustain it.'
v. Pacific G. & E. Co. (1942), 20
529] ; see also In ·re Herr em
P.2d 345] ; Reclamation Distr·ict
147, 156 [218 P. 762].)
porting the legislative
burden of overcoming the nw>onm
cast upon the assailant.'
(1947), supra, 30 CaL2d 719, 728
410 [68 S.Ct. 1138, 92 IJ.Ed.
Growers ( 19-13), 22 Cal.2d
507
In re Fuller (1940), 15 Cal.2d
California Phygicians' Service v. Oarr·ison
790, 803 [172 P.2d 4, 167 A.ILR.
.)
should be reasonable; i.e., 'have a
legitimate object to be
our concern whether the
might think to be the wisest
accomplishing its objects.
(1945), 26 Cal.2d 224, 232, 234
1109] .) "
[5b] Applying the above principles to
involved, we cannot hold, as a matter of
fication here concerned has no reasonable
may take judicial notice of the
in the state; of the exodus of
tion of cities into surrounding
of the problems confronting small
cilities for caring for such an increase(l
[12] (2) Jfunicipal
rule: "
those words are used in the
business affairs of a municipality.
CaL 383, 387 [58 P. 923].)

here
that the elassiWe
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!47 C.2(1

the manner
I of this

sewers, light and power
pal uses, wharves,
fire apparatus, street
structures necessary or convenient to carry
purposes, and powers of the
''
[13] 'l'he
to
made in the ins1ant ease
consist of covering "\Valnut Creek which traverses the business
area so that it may be used; to
to extend
non-through
to wid<'n other
in order to provide adequately for the
incnased traffic circulation
in the commercial area. There can be no question that the
proposed improvements fall within the definition of municipal
affairs as that rule is set forth in the decided eases (see
Byrne v. Dra;in, 127 CaL 663
P. 433]; Ahlman v. Barber
Asphalt Pav. Co., 40 Cal.App. 395 fl81 P. 238] ; City of
San Jose v. Lynch, 4 Cal.2cl 760 [52 P.2cl 919]; Loop Lbr. Co.
v. Van Loben
173 CaL 228
P. 600]). It has been
held that the term "street work" ine1udes the bui1<1ing and
construction of
highways, and boulevards (City of
San Diego v. Potter,] 53 Cal. 288
P. 1461 ; City of Crescent
City v. Moran, 25 Cal.App.2d 133
P.2d 281] ; Gov. Code,
§ 43601).
[14] We are of the
IJimited Obligation
Bond Law fulfills the seeoml
that the lrgis1ation
relate to a municipal affair.
[15] Permissible Extent of Indebic(lness: Respondent
raises a question as to whether seetion 43605 of the Government Code is app1icable here. 'l'hat section proviclrs: "Jlfa:rimtLm indebtedness: 'Jnclebtedncss.' A
shall not incur
an indebtedness for public
\Vhich exceeds in
the aggregate 15
of the assessed value of all real and
personal property of the
·within the
of this
section 'indebtedness' means bonded indebtedness of the city
payable from the peoceeds of taxes levied upon taxable property in the city."
Statf;;. 19fi5, ch. :J:14. § 1.1 'l'h('
just quoted section has nothing to clo with the Limited Obliga-

81H

v.

l':nch as
violated by revenue bonds
which are payable
from a special
tl;e
is not liable to maintnnd out of its general fnnds, or by tax
the
fnw1 prove insufficient. (Depart218 CaL 206, 216 ct seq.
Toll Bridge Authority v. Kelly,
P.2d 425] ; In 're California Toll
Cal.
et seq. i 288 P. 485]
many cases from other jurisdidions] ; Shelton
Los
206 CaL
548 ct seq. [275 P. 421];
see Garrett v.
216 Cal. 220, 227 ct seq. [13 P.2d
725]; 88 Am.Jur. 150 et seq.) [17] As pointed out in the
case of In re Califor11ia To!l Bridge A1lthority, supm, 212
Cal. at page
such an obligation is not considered to be
an indebtedness or liability of the political subdivision or
agency issuing the
within the meaning of the constitutional limitation.'' And on page 737 it was concluded
that "an obligmion whieh is payable out of a speeial fund
is not an 'indebt edHess or liability' of a governmental body
within the meaning of section 18 of article XI of the Constitntion if the governmental body is not required to pay
the obligation from its general funds, or by exercise of its
powers of taxation, should the special fund prove insufficient." (See also
A nthority v. Dockweiler, 14 Cal.2d
437
P.:2ll
of I,a Jlcsa v.
137 CaL
App.2d Rn f291 P.2d
; Board of Harbor Comt·s. v. Dean,
118 Cal
li28 [258 P.2d 590].)

0.2d
Obligation

J

In Bank.

Spence,

Feb. 1, 1957.]

on Habeas Corpus.
Law-Probation-WithdrawaL-Probation is an act
and
be withdrawn if the privilege is abused.
Id.-Probation-1\'Iodification.-An abuse of the privilege of
is shown where defendant practices a deception on
the court at the time probation is granted or violates any
terms
conditions of probation (Pen. Code, § 1203.2), in which
court is specifically authorized to modify and change
case
any and all terms and conditions of probation. (Pen. Code,
§
Id.-Probation-Modification.-While the court has a wide
or modifying the terms of probation,
or capriciously.
Appealable-Order Granting Probation.-An order
probation is appealable under Pen.
subd. 1, as amended in 1951.
!d.-Probation-Revocation-New Probation.-The court has
1tuL:>ucwt.w,,, on revocation of probation, to place defendant on
with new conditions.
!d.-Appeal - Decisions Appealable - Order Modifying Probation.-Should the court arbitrarily modify a probationary
order without
judgment and sentence, an appeal will
therefrom under Pen. Code, § 1237, subd. 3, as an appeal
from an order made after judgment affecting the substantial
of the probationer.
See Cal.Jur.2d, Judgments, § 363 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Criminal Law, § 994; [3, 5, 9, 10]
Criminal Law,§ 997; [4, 6] Criminal Law, § 1053(5); [7] Habeas
Corpus, § 12; [8] Habeas Corpus, § 7.

